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THE REASONABLE DURATION OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND THE
CONTRACT-BAR RULE
I. INTRODUCTION
The National Labor Relations Act gives employees the right to or-
ganize and to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing' on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment.2 The Act further provides that the employer must bar-
gain with this chosen representative.3 The usual result of these re-
quirements is the formulation of a collective bargaining agreement
in the form of a written contract. This is intended to stabilize the em-
ployer-employee relationship and thus minimize industrial strife and
unrest.4 To further stabilize relations the National Labor Relations
Board has developed what is commonly called the "contract-bar rule,"
which provides that a representation election will not be ordered among
employees who are already covered by a valid, existing, collective bar-
gaining contract of reasonable duration.5 This rule has been enunciated
to mitigate any conflict which may arise as a result of the provision in
the Act which gives employees the right to change their bargaining
representative. 6
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the "reasonable dura-
tion" aspect of the "contract-bar rule" with the thought of furnishing
employers and unions with a relatively precise yardstick for determin-
ing when a contract will bar a representation election.
II. ANALYSIS
The policy of the National Labor Relations Board, in this area,
has varied somewhat through the years. For a clear understanding of
the Board's position today, it is helpful to trace the development of the
"reasonable duration" test and determine what, if anything, remains
for a present day employer or union to consider when confronted by
a contract duration problem. Initially there was no contract-bar rule
and representation elections were allowed at any time.7 The existing
agreement, however, continued and any newly elected representative
was required to comply with it.8 These early principles were considered
1 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §157 (1935).
261 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §158 (1935).
3 Ibid.
4 61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §151 (1935).
5 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927, 19 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1947).
6,61 STAT. 136, 29 U.S.C. §159 (a) (1935).
7 New England Transportation Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 130, 1 L.R.R.M. 97 (1936). The
Board relied on the National Mediation Board's agency theory set forth in
a railroad case. See, First Annual Report of the National Mediation Board
23-24 (1935).
s Ibid.: Also see American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250, 32 L.R.R.M. 1439
(1953), which was the first case to decide that a contract need not be as-
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the basis of "the whole process of collective bargaining and unre-
stricted choice of representatives."9 A new representative, while re-
quired to function under the existing agreement, could bargain con-
cerning any changes, or follow any procedure therein, allowing for
the termination of the contract.10
The contract-bar rule began to appear less than two years after this
initial pronouncement. The Board refused to order an election when
they found that a one year contract, when negotiated and executed,
was favored by a majority of the employees the petitioning union then
clamied to represent.-1 In commenting on the duration of the contract,
the Board merely stated that it was "not for such a long period as to
be contrary to the policies or purposes of the Act. 1' 2 A short time later
this stand was reemphasized when an election was not ordered during
the term of an eleven month contract although the contracting union
had been certified one and one-half years before.13 In addition to the
fact that the union represented a majority of the employees in an
appropriate unit when the contract was executed, emphasis was given
to the fact that the majority was not gained by any unfair labor prac-
tices as defined by the Act.1 4 While the Board, however, was holding
that one-year contracts were a bar to representative elections, contracts
of a longer term were not a bar if they had been in existence for one
year, and the evidence raised a substantial question as to whether the
employees wished the incumbent union to continue to represent them.'0
Once the one-year contract-bar policy had been developed, it was
an easy step, in order to "attain stabilized relations in the industry,"
and when certain conditions were present, to extend the period.1 7 Thus,
despite a substantial change in affiliation from the representing union
to the challenging union, a two year contract that had been in existence
for more than one year was held a bar to an election because the con-
sumed by a newly certified union. In all other cases, the Board did not decide
one way or another.
9 See note 7 supra.
lo Swayne-Hoyt, 2 N.L.R.B. 282, 1 L.RR.M. 99 (1936).
11 Superior Electrical Products Co., 6 N.L.R.B. 19, 2 L.R.R.M. 105 (1938).
12. Ibid.
23 National Sugar Refining Co. of N.J., 10 N.L.R.B. 1410, 3 L.R.R.M. 544 (1938).
Board member Edwin S. Smith dissents on basis of New England Transpor-
tation Corp., see note 7 supra. Also see, George L. Madden, 42 N.L.R.B. 885,
10 L.R.R.M. 207 (1942)
14 Ibid.
I5 Los Angeles Shipbuilding and Drydock Co., 40 N.L.R.B. 1150, 10 L.R.R.M. 93(1942), national emergency and/or two year contract; Kahn v. Feldman, Inc.,
30 N.L.R.B. 294, 8 L.R.R.M. 49 (1941), two year contract; Lewis Steel Products
Corp., 23 N.L.R.B. 793, 6 L.R.R.M. 338 (1940) ,two year contract; Riverside and
Fort Lee Ferry Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 493, 6 L.R.R.M. 319 (1940), three year con-
tract.
G 0Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 7 N.L.R.B. 662, 2 L.R.R.M. 322 (1938), five
year contract.
17 Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., 36 N.L.R.B. 990, 9 L.R.R.M. 184 (1941).
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tract contained a closed shop provision and not all of the members of
the representing union had shifted allegiance.ls The Board also had
held that a contract for more than a one year period barred an election
when the parties to the contract had a previous contract of the same
duration during a five year bargaining history.19 More definitely the
Board had stated that a contract was of reasonable duration and thus
a bar to an election when the parties had a history of bargaining for a
two year contract and that such contract duration was the prevailing
practice of firms in that industry.20
Subsequent to the above type exceptions to the rule that contracts
of over one year duration were unreasonable and therefore not a bar
to representative elections, the Board had occasion to review their
previous decisions, and again, "in the interest of industrial stability,"
set forth a new rule. 2' This time a contract of two years' duration
was presumed to be reasnable and only when it could be shown, by
the challenging union, that contracts shorter than two years in duration
were the well established custom in the industry, or that under the cir-
cumstances of the particular case the contract term was unreasonable,
would an investigation of representatives be undertaken.2 2 A contract
of more than two years' duration, however, continued not to be a bar
to a representative election after being in effect for more than one
year,23 unless the party relying on the contract definitely established
that it was of reasonable duration by showing that it was in accord
18 Ibid. Also see, Douglas and Lomason Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 69, 8 L.R.R.M. 328
(1941). But see, Chicago Hair Curled Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1674, 14 L.R.R.M. 201
(1944) where a three year contract was not a bar to an election. The Board
relied on the rule, "well recognized in the law of collective bargaining" that
a contract was not a bar at the end of the first contract year. This case was
distinguished from Owens-Illinois Pacific Coast Co., supra, where there was
a "custom . . . apparently national in scope," that justified an exception for
two year contracts. The distinction is hard to see.
19 American Finishing Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 313, 12 L.R.R.M. 237 (1943), twenty-two
month contract; also see West Virginia Coal and Coke Corp., 58 N.L.R.B. 1,
15 L.R.R.M. 13 (1944), a two year contract was a bar. All contracts between
the parties since 1935 had been for a two year period.
20 Celluplastic Corp., 60 N.L.R.B. 172, 15 L.R.R.M. 226 (1945). The contracting
union (A.F. of L.) had, since 1939, entered into a two-year contracts exclusively
w ith plastic fabricating firms. At this time they had two-year contracts with
a manufacturing Association, representing forty-nine firms, as well as with
twenty individual companies. The petitioning union (CIO), at this time, had
no contracts in the metropolitan (Newark, N.J.) area.
21 Uxbridge Worsted Co., Inc., 60 N.L.R.B. 1395, 16 L.R.R.M. 55 (1945). A two
year contract in the woolen and worsted industry was held not to be of un-
reasonable duration under the rule on the basis of the practices of the three
leading unions in this field. Two preferred one-year contracts; the other, two-
year contracts, both on occasion deviating from their respective policies. Com-
piled data of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Department of Labor in
regard to collective bargaining agreements in this industry was also considered.
22 Ibid.23Rainbow Lithographing Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1383, 18 L.R.R.M. 1317 (1946), three




with the general practice in the industry involved,24 or as more fre-
quently stated, was in accord with the custom in the industry.2
Another significant modification in Board policy occurred when
it was decided that a contract of two years' duration was a bar to an
election even when it had been in effect for more than one year and
despite a proven custom of only one-year contracts in the industry in-
volved.26 In cases where the contracts were of more than two years'
duration evidence of "custom in the industry" remained the test of a
contract's reasonableness. 27 Regardless, however, of the finding of un-
reasonable duration, the contract was a bar for its initial two year
period.2
At present, the basic rule remains that contracts of two or more
years' duration are per se a bar to representative elections during the
initial two year period.2 9 This rule presents little or no problem for
24 Omar, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B. 1126, 18 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1946), three year contract.25Boulevard Transit Lines, Inc., 71 N.L.R.B. 719, 19 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1946) ; Omar,
Inc., see note 24 supra, three year contract of reasonable duration; Ameri-
can Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., 67 N.L.R.B. 1152, 18 L.R.R.M. 1049 (1946), three-
year contracts of unreasonable duration.
26 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927, 19 L.R.R.M. 1227 (1947). There are three
reasons for the new rule: 1) In applying the rule that two-year contracts are
presumably reasonable, nothing was discovered indicating that such contracts
unduly limited the rights of employees to change their representatives; 2)
added security in the position of the parties who have entered into a two year
contract as opposed to a one year contract; 3) The passing of the experi-
mental and transitional period of collective bargaining and the, then, necessity
of allowing a frequent change in representatives. But see, United Parcel Serv-
ice of New York, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 888, 20 L.R.R.M. 1226 (1947) where it was
held that a two year contract in effect for only one year was not a bar to a
determination of representatives because at the time the contract was signed
the employer had completed plans for expansion, which expansion was immi-
nent, and therefore to bar an election would deny the employees. in the ex-
panded unit the right to select their own bargaining representative for an
unreasonable period of time. The unit was expanded from nine to twenty
employes shortly before a retroactive contract was executed.
27 [bid. Also see National Aniline Division, Allied Chemical and Dye Corp., 102
N.L.R.B. 129, 31 L.R.R.M. 1284 (1953), three year contract; Union Starch and
Refining Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 567, 30 L.R.R.M. 1313 (1952), three year contract;
American Seating Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 800, 29 L.R.R.M. 1424 (1952), three year
contract; Cushman's Sons Inc., 88 N.L.R.B. 121, 25 L.R.R.M. 1296 (1950),
four year contract; Rheinstein Construction Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 46, 25 L.R.R.M.
1284 (1950), four year contract; General Aniline and Film Corp., 79 N.L.R.B.
79, 22 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1948), three year contract; California Walnut Grower's
Association, 77 N.L.R.B. 756, 22 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1948), three year contract; and
Puritan Ice Co., 74 N.L.R.B. 1311, 20 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1947), four year contract.
28 Union Starch and Refining Co.; American Seating Co.; Cushman's Sons, Inc.;
see note 27 supra. Sanson Hosiery Mills, Inc., 84 N.L.R.B. 654, 23 L.R.R.M.
1114 (1949), the contract was a bar for the initial two year period even
though the employer attempted to unilaterally terminate it; Puritan Ice Co.,
see note 27 supra; and Fitrol Corp., 74 N.L.R.B. 1307, 20 L.R.R.M. 1272 (1947).29 Ames, Harris, & Neville, 118 N.L.R.B. No. 43, 40 L.R.R.M. 1186 (1957) ; Cen-
tral San Vicente, Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 39 L.R.R.M. 1243 (1957) ; Pazan
Motor Freight, Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 224, 39 L.R.R.M. 1045 (1956); and
Stewart-Warner Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 1222, 36 L.R.R.M. 1176 (1955). But see
Kearney and Trecker Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 275, 39 L.R.R.M. 1118 (1956)
for an exception to the normal contract bar rule when there was a schism in
the contracting union, a seizure of its assets by the dissident group, the use
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employers or unions. The problems lies with the contract term that
exceeds two years. "In place of the former test predicted on 'custom
in the industry,' the test to be applied" today to determine the "reason-
ableness of contract duration for contract-bar purposes" is "whether
a substantial part of the industry is covered by contracts of a similar
term." 30
Before analyzing the present test of "reasonableness" for contracts
of more than two years' duration it is useful to understand the
Board's attitude toward "custom in the industry." The decisions es-
tablish that the Board was always impressed by the fact that a high per-
centage of firms, in similar industry, had contracts of the duration in
controversy. The cases, decided, reveal that over a 50% coverage was
always necessary to establish a "custom."' 31
Of particular significance when the "custom test" was the rule, is
the fact that "recent innovations" in the length of collective bargaining
agreements were not considered a part of a "well established custom." 32
of the assets by them, and a court decision setting aside a Board election
between the two groups.
30 General Motors Corp., Detroit Transmission Division, 102 N.L.R.B. 1140, 31
L.R.R.M. 1344 (1953).31Sutherland Paper Co., 64 N.L.R.B. 719, 17 L.R.R.M. 143 (1945). 126 contracts
of one year duration were shown as against only three contracts of two
year's duration; Kennecott Copper Corp., 63 N.L.R.B. 466, 17 L.R.R.M. 3 (1945).
General evidence of a custom was not sufficient when evidence of other
length contracts was also introduced. The Board also placed reliance on the
fact that, in any event, the contract involved had only sixteen more months
to run and therefore was not unreasonable duration when coupled with excep-
tions to a one year contract practice; U.S. Finishing Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 575, 17
L.R.R.M. 12 (1945), where it was shown that 250 plants in an area where
90% of the industry was located and seventeen more, of twenty-nine, where
the party employer and 5% of the industry was located were covered by
three-year contracts; Omar, Inc., see note 24 supra. Ten of nineteen agree-
ments were for three year's duration. The industry involved was the baking
industry of the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, where there only were six
major bakeries, two exclusive chain store bakeries and several of the neigh-
borhood type. Also see note 71 infra: California Walnut Grower's Association,
see note 27 supra. The record did not show that the employer's operations of
packing and marketing walnuts dominated the industry, but the Board was
satisfied that the operations were not an "inconsiderable" portion of all walnut
growers when 9,300 independent growers were covered by three-year con-
tracts; Also see note 71 infra. But see, Boulevard Transit Lines, Inc., note 25
supra, where a three year custom was not established when twenty contracts
of one year length, the majority with interstate bus lines, were shown as
against only six contracts of three year's duration, which for the most part
were with intrastate lines; American Powder Works, Inc., 69 N.L.R.B. 1367,
18 L.R.R.M. 1322 (1946). Two contracts of three years' duration did not es-
tablish a custom when a "number of one year contracts" were also in evi-
dence. A contract for two years' duration with an automatic renewal provi-
sion for a one year period is not a three year contract; Cushman's Sons, Inc.,
see note 27 supra. A three year custom was not established when the inter-
venor showed that of the four contracts in the New York City area in the
baking industry, the petitioner had one three year contract with a retail
chain. There was no evidence of the number of stores or employees covered,
however. The other three contracts were of one year's duration. As is later
shown in this article, a problem often arose as to what constituted an industry.
32 American Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., see note 25 supra.
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Therefore, the Board found that three-year contracts were of unreason-
able duration, despite a "substantial number" of them, when they be-
gan to appear just one year prior to the challenging union's petition.33
Likewise, the "present negotiation" of numerous five-year contracts3"
and a new union policy of longer-duration contracts 35 were not evi-
dence of a custom in the industry.
In contrast to the above "custom in the industry' test of reasonable-
ness, the present rule is based on a "substantial part of the industry"
test. The General Motors decision3G in 1953 emphatically indicates
the change without explaining the difference or significance. The only
lead to the difference is gleaned from the Board's reasoning for the
change. The test, said the Board, "is more practical, is in keeping with
present day economic developments and will better effectuate the poli-
cies of the act." On its face this means nothing, but when coupled with
the Board's concept of what is "substantial," a fairly accurate standard
can be set up despite the interchange of the terms "custom" and "sub-
stantial" in subsequent decisions.37
Before proceeding with a discussion of what is "substantial," it
seems best at this point to break down the present test of "reasonable-
ness of contract duration for contract-bar purposes" and analyze it
in the light of the manner an employer or union would have to proceed
when confronted with the problem. To reiterate, the test of reason-
ableness is presently determined " . . . on the basis of whether a sub-
stantial part of the industry is covered by contracts of a similar term."3
Obviously, the first problem is to determine, what "industry" is in-
volved. This must be done before the "substantial" test can be applied.
At first this does not seem to pose much of a problem. But reflection
suggests a number of questions: To what industry do you belong if you
are engaged in dual or multiple operations? To what industry do you
belong if you manufacture parts for another industry or industries? To
what industry do you belong if part of your employees, or one of your
plants, is engaged exclusively in one industry, the remainder in an-
other? Is the industry, to which the substantial test is applied, the en-
tire industry or merely the organized segment? Is it the nationwide
33 Ibid. Also see California Walnut Grower's Association, note 27 supra.
34 Puritan Ice Co., see note 27 supra.
35 Reed Roller Bit Co., see note 26 supra.
3G See note 30 supra.
37 Kearney and Trecker Corp., see note 29 supra, "customary in any substantial
portion ;" Zip-O-Log Veneer, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 1303, 36 L.R.R.M. 1192 (1955),
"no showing of industry practice;" American Bemberg, Division of Beaunit
Mills, Inc., 111 N.L.R.B. 963, 35 L.R.R.M. 1633 (1955), "customary in a sub-
stantial part ;" Columbia Broadcasting System, 108 N.L.R.B. 1468, 34 L.R.R.M.
1228 (1954), "custom in this industry;" Supreme Food Exchange, Inc., 105
N.L.R.B. 918, 32 L.R.R.M. 1379 (1953), "customary in the industry;" and Reo
Mfg. Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1493, 31 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1953), "customary in this
industry."
38 See note 30 supra.
1957]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
industry or the industry determined on a local, or immediate area,
basis? These are some of the "industry" questions, 39 that must be
answered.
The Board seems to rely heavily, for industrial classifications, on
their prior decisions,4° analyses by the United States Bureau of Labor
Statistics4l and more recently on the Standard Industrial Classification
Manual.42 In general it can be said that there are certain well es-
tablished industries. The automotive,43 the aircraft," and steel45 are
examples. With these there is usually no quarrel unless a finer industry
breakdown or even a more inclusive one is attempted. The Board
holds that an independent manufacturer of component parts for the
automotive industry is part of that industry.46 Great stress is placed
on the fact that the parts manufacturer's chief competitors, as well as
customers, are automobile manufacturers.4 - A similar policy probably
exists in the aviation and aviation parts industry, although an inde-
pendent status seems to be given to the aviation parts industry. 4 In
39 Republic Aviation Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 569, 34 L.R.R.M. 1406 (1954). See dis-
sent for the posing of some of these questions and the urging of a straight two
year contract duration rule so that no problem would arise in determining
whether a particular long term contract is a bar or not.
40 Budd Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 457, 35 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1955); also see Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 389, 35 L.R.R.M. 1479 (1955) ; International Harvester
Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 221, 31 L.R.R.M. 1507 (1953).
41 Heintz Mfg. Co., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 38 L.R.R.M. 1207 (1956) ; Republic Avia-
tion Corp., see note 39 supra; Bendix Aviation Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1137, 31
L.R.R.M. 1346 (1953) ; Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1135, 31 L.R.R.M.
1447 (1953).
42 Diamond Lumber Co., 117 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 39 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1957). The
Standard Industrial Classification Manuel, prepared in the Bureau of the
Budget by the Technical Committee on Industrial Classification is intended
to aid in securing uniformity and comparibility in the presentation of statisti-
cal data collected by various government agencies. Also see Heintz Mfg. Co..
see note 41 supra and Ames, Harris, & Neville, 118 N.L.R.B. No. 105, 40
L.R.R.M. 1263 (1957).
43See note 30 supra.
44Republic Aviation Corp., see note 39 supra.
45Thompson Wire Co., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 278, 39 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1956).
46Bendix Products Division, Bendix Aviation Corp., see note 41 supra. This
division does not manufacture complete automobiles, nor is it a subsidiary of
an automobile manufacturer. Aircraft parts were manufactured as well as
automobile parts. No production statistics are given.4 Consideration was also given to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics analysis
placing automobile parts under automobile and to the fact that "other Machin-
ery and Fabricated Metal Products" industry has the same length contract.
Also see, The Carborundum Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 192, 32 L.R.R.M. 1255 (1953),
where consideration was given to the fact that a manufacturer of abrasives'
chief customers (automotive and farm equipment manufactures) were covered
by five-year contracts. But see, Bendix Aviation Corp., note 48 infra, where
the Board gave no consideration to the "chief customer" contention when
they found that the particular plant involved was engaged in the aviation
parts industry and Budd Co., note 40 supra where no consideration was
given to the contention that the sales and manpower figures pertaining to jet
engine parts that were supplied to a company primarily engaged in automo-
bile manufacturing should be given weight as evidence of belonging to the
automotive industry.
48 Bendix Aviation Corp., 111 N.L.R.B. 456, 35 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1955). There is
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an attempt to subdivide the aviation parts industry, an aviation engine
industry was not recognized.4 9 In similar fashion, an effort to es-
tablish a Douglas fir plywood industry, rather than the more inclusive
lumber or plywood industries, met with failure. 50 On the other hand,
an attempt to set up an all inclusive transportation equipment manu-
facturing industry, in lieu of the already established automotive and
aviation industries, was also denied.51
Specifically, the industry problem takes shape when the employer
is engaged in a multiplant, diversified operation. When a contract-bar
issue is raised at one of these plants, the plant involved seems to fall
within one of the following categories: First, the plant produces items
ready for sale to the public or parts for another manufacturer, or both.
It is not an integral part of a company-wide system and is not governed
by a national agreement.5 2 Second, the plant manufactures parts for
the employer's other plants5' and is an integral part of the employer's
main operation. 4  A national agreement is not involved. 5  Third, the
plant manufactures items ready for sale to the public, does not manu-
facture any items for use in tie employer's main industrial operation
and in no way can be said to belong to that industry. The contract
involved is part of a national agreementY
The determination of industry, when the plant falls within the first
category, is on the same basis as any one-plant, diversified operation."
The decision would hinge on the question of what is the primary in-
dustry in that individual plant.58 Thus, a plant was found to be in-
volved in the aviation engine parts industry when 75% of the dollar
value and 90% of the labor of that plant were concerned with that
industry.59 A plant was not a part of the aircraft industry when 60%
of its current, total production, based on dollar valie, and 60% of
some indication that had sufficient evidence been submitted, a-finer break-
down might have resulted.
49 Ibid.
5oDiamond Lumber Co., see note 42 supra.
51 Budd Co., see note 40 supra.
52 Bendix Aviation Corp. and Budd Co., see note 47 supra. But see, Allis-Chal-
mers Mfg. Co., note 41 supra, where the plant with the contract problem
manufactured agricultural, heavy type industrial and electrical equipment and
consideration was given to the fact that of the other ten Allis-Chalmer's
plants, five mainly produced agricultural equipment.
53 International Harvester Co., Milwaukee Works, see note 40 supra.
54 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., see note 40 supra. The plant concerned manufactured
electric motors, centrifugal pumps and textrope sheaves and therefore could
not be said to be chiefly engaged in the manufacture of farm equipment.
55 See notes 53 and 54 supra.
56 General Motors Corp. (Milwaukee Plant), A.C. Spark Plug Division, 102
N.L.R.B. 1139, 31 L.R.R.M. 1345 (1953).
57 Heintz Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra and Royal jet, Inc., 113 N.L.R.B. 1064, 36
L.R.R.M. 1477 (1955). It is not certain from the reports of these decisions
that the companies involved are one-plant operations, but the principle stands,
regardless.
5 sSee notes 52 and 57 supra.
59 Bendix Aviation Corp., see note 48 supra. Also see Budd Co., note 40 supra.
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the employees were concerned with the manufacture of heating equip-
ment60 Similarly, a plant was not in the aircraft or automobile indus-
try when 50 to 60% of the total sales and employee complement during
the contract period fell into the metal stamping and miscellaneous
fabrication industry. 61
The industry of a plant in the second category is based on the
employer's primary industry, determined by reference to the company-
wide, combined plant operations.62  Thus a plant was a part of the
farm equipment manufacturing industry when it manufactured parts
for the employer's other plants which were determined to be primarily
engaged in that industry.63 It is clear, however, that the plant's entire
output need not be utilized by the employer's other plants.64 A 20%
consumption, with the remainder sold to customers, has been found
to be sufficient when the plant involved was an "integral part" of the
employer's, previously determined, primary industry.65
A plant in the third category, similarly, belongs to the primary in-
dustry of the employer, determined on company-wide, combined op-
erations basis.66 Thus, a plant engaged exclusively in the manufacture
of navigational computers and bombsights was governed by the Board's
decision for the automobile industry, the employer's main industry.
6 7
The Board held that since the "national agreement" was already held
to be a bar for the main industry, ". . . it similarly precludes an election
for any group of employes subject to its terms, regardless of their
specific work assignments. '68  The theory of this ruling is based on
an analysis of the collective bargaining history between the employer
and the union, and the "salutory and stabilizing effect of that relation-
ship."69
After it has been determined to what industry classification the
contract in question belongs, it is necessary to ascertain the "whole"
from which "substantial" is to be derived. 73 Generally it can be
60 Royal Jet, Inc., see note 57 supra. It is interesting to note that sometime after
the execution of the contract involved the employer added aviation fuel tanks
to its products and in the year prior to this decision, that production ex-
ceeded the heating equipment. This is most likely the reason for the emphasis
on "current" statistics as distinguished from the Heintz case, see note 61
infra, where the contract period was used.61 Heintz Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra.
62 See notes 53 and 54 supra.
63 See note 54 supra.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid. Also see Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., note 41 supra.
66 See note 56 supra.
6r7 Ibid.
6s Ibid.
69 See note 56 supra. For rationale see note 30 supra.
70 The only portion of the "reasonableness test" that was changed by the General
Motors case, see note 36 supra, was "customary in the industry" to "substan-
tial part of the industry;" therefore, for all practical purposes, any reference
to "industry" that took place before the General Motors case (1953) should
be applicable to the present test.
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assumed that the entire industry7' is the "whole." This, of course, is
the safe assumption as usually a determination of "substantial" on any
other basis will necessarily be included therein. If, however, "sub-
stantial" cannot be shown on an entire industry basis it may be ad-
vantageous to do so on a local, or immediate area basis or by use of
only the organized segment of the industry. This suggestion is worthy
of consideration because an absolute interpretation of "a substantial
part of the industry" has not been made by the Board and there is
some indication that determination could be made on the locaF2 or
organized segment 73 basis. The contract practice in the baking industry
has been determined on the basis of the particular locality involved.7 4
There is some question as to whether this ruling would be applicable
today,7 5 but the fact that such a decision has been made, always leaves
open the possibility for similar pronouncements.
Assuming that the industry questions have been settled, the next
and final step of the employer or union is to show that a "substantial"
part of the industry is cqvered by contracts of similar term and there-
fore that the contract in question is not of an unreasonable duration.
The burden of proving this is always on the party asserting, as a bar,
the contract of more than two years' duration.7 6 "Substantial" was
established, for the first time in the automobile industry77 when General
71 Diamond Lumber Co., see not 42 supra; Heintz Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra;
and Joseph Aronauer, Inc., 106 N.L.R.B. 1382, 33 L.R.R.M. 1025 (1953). Proof
of the total number of employees in the industry and the percent of the entire
industry covered by similar contracts is required.
72 Boulevard Transit Lines, Inc., see note 31 supra. No comment was necessary
concerning the entire, industry, even though only evidence of the immediate
area was submitted, as the burden of proof was not sustained even on the
local area basis. California Walnut Growers Association, see note 31 supra;
Rheinstein Construction Co., see note 27 supra, the burden of proof of the
custom in the "building maintenance work in the New York area" was not
sustained; see note 44 supra, the burden of proof was sustained "whether
viewed on a national or Eastern segment basis;" Home Curtain Corp., 111
N.L.R.B. 336, 35 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1955), reconsideration denied, 111 N.L.R.B.
1253, 35 L.R.R.M. 1683 (1955), the burden of proof was sustained on a
nationwide as well as New York Metropolitan basis.
7 Home Curtain Corp., see note 72 supra; Republic Aviation Corp., see note 39
supra; and The Carborundum Co., see note 47 supra.
74 See Omar, Inc. and Cushman's Sons, Inc., note 31 supra. The Board confined
itself to the contract practice in the particular locality involved because
bakeries are located in relation to population and because of the perishability
of the products.
75Union Starch and Refining Co., see note 27 supra. The Board states that the
custom of the contract duration in the particular industry, rather than special
circumstances relating to individual employers, is the test for determining
reasonableness. These cases setting forth a definite exception are strong evi-
dence that the entire industry must be looked to, generally, in determining
what is substantial.76 Heintz Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra. A challenging union will attempt to show
a contract to be of reasonable duration when it wants to show a "premature
extension." The doctrine only applies when the earlier agreement was itself
a bar at the time the new contract is executed.
77 General Motors Corp., Detroit Transmission Division, see note 30 supra. The
contracts ranged from three years, eleven months to five years, ten months. The
Board, however, did not pass on whether contracts of more than five years'
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Motors showed that their long term contract (five years) was followed
by every major manufacturer in the industry and that of the 537,500
employees in the industry, they had 265,000. On the same day, the
Board found that five-year contracts were also of reasonable duration
in the farm equipment manufacturing industry78 because three of the
four major producers of this type equipment had agreements of five
years' duration covering 38,000 employees which was a "considerable
portion. of the industry." Five-year contracts covered a "clear sub-
stantial portion" of the abrasive products industry when 4,370 em-
ployees, or 65%, of the 6,740 organized employees in the industry in
the United States were governed by such agreements.-9 In the aviation
industry a three year contract was found to be reasonable.8 0 The in-
dustry had forty-three manufacturers, and of this number, twenty-six
of them employed 136,200 people, or 90% of the total number in the in-
dustry. Of these twenty-six, ten had contracts of longer than two years'
duration. The number of employees covered by the ten contracts
is not indicated, but the Board felt that the facts given were suffi-
cient to find substantial, especially since two years later 42.4% of
the organized industry had contracts for three or more years' duration.
The Home Curtain Corporation decision81 gives, perhaps, the best
indication of what the Board is likely to find as the minimum re-
quirement to satisfy the "substantial part of the industry" test. There,
only 30% of all the employees in the industry were covered by three-
year contracts and the test was met. Generally, when the "substantial"
test is not met, no evidence of the industry practice has been sub-
mitted, or if it has, the Board merely comments that the evidence
was not sufficient.8 2 As a result, it is difficult to tell what has been
found to be not a "substantial part of the industry" and the require-
ments to satisfy the test must be obtained from decisions where "sub-
stantial" has been established. Some help is obtained, however, in
the negative approach, in that it has been clearly stated a number of
times'- that it is not sufficient for the party urging the contract as a
duration could be, under any circumstances, of reasonable duration for con-
tract-bar purposes.
78 Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra.
79 The Carborundum Co., see note 47 supra.80 The Republic Aviation Corp., see note 39 supra.
81 1i N.L.R.B. 336, 35 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1955). Evidence that 40% of all the organ-
ized employees in the industry were covered by three-year contracts, as well
as the immediate area statistics (80% of the organized and almost 50% of
all) was submitted. From the decision it is impossible to tell how much
weight the Board afforded each, and what, if anything, standing alone would
have been sufficient.
s2 Central San Vincent, Inc., see note 29 supra; Southeastern Greyhound Lines,
115 N.L.R.B. 1135, 38 L.R.R.M. 1018 (1956) ; Dryden Rubber Division, Shel-
ler Mfg. Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1652, 35 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1954); Coil Winders,
Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 827, 34 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1954); and Duncan Foundry and
Machine Works, Inc., 107 N.L.R.B. 298, 33 L.R.R.M. 1125 (1953).S3 Diamond Lumber Co., see note 42 sut'ra, 95% of its contracts were for five
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bar to merely show the duration and number of its contracts in the
industry, or in an employer association, or the number of employees
covered by these contracts. The party must go further and relate the
percent of the long term contracts to the entire industry or the em-
ployees covered by long term contracts to the total number of em-
ployees in the industry.8 4
Of particular significance is the recent decision in the Thompson
Wire Company case85 involving a three year contract in the steel
industry. The petition and hearing on the representative question came
about after two years had run on the contract and while two-year .con-
tracts were the standard length in the industry. Subsequent to these
events, but prior to the Board decision, the basic steel industry es-
tablished a new pattern of three-year contracts for its members. The
Board took "official notice" of this new industrial pattern and relying
on the test of the General Motors case,86 held that in using a "realistic
approach," by giving "appropriate recognition to the circumstances
now in existence," by according "full weight to the current contractual
period prevalent in the steel industry," rather than to "circumstances
that no longer exist," the three year contract would bar an election.8 7
This decision opens up a whole new area of uncertainty for em-
ployers and unions. It is now absolutely impossible to predict, at the
years' duration, but this represented only half of the employees in the con-
tended for industry. Also, no other union in the industry had five-year con-
tracts; Heintz Mfg. Co., see note 41 supra, eighty of its contracts (eighty-
nine two years later) were of three years' duration and 50% of the em-
ployees were covered by these contracts. The opposing union showed a list
of twenty-six agreements in the industry (obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics) and only 15% of the employees were covered by three-year
contracts; Joseph Aronauer, Inc., see note 71 supra, 80% of its contracts
were for three years and 500 of the 3,000 employees it represented.
S C. A. Olsen Mfg. Co., Ames, Harris, & Neville, see note 29 supra; Heintz
Mfg. Co. and Joseph Aronauer, Inc., see notes 41 and 71 supra. Prior to the
Aronauer decision it was the practice of some multi-plant and multi-contract
employers to submit evidence of the number of long term contracts they had
in their organization. See, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., note 41 supra, nine of
eleven plants were covered by five-year contracts; International Harvester
Co., Milwaukee Works, see note.40 supra, over 100 five-year contracts with
the UAW-CIO and four in the plant in question; The Carborundum Co., see
note 47 supra, 90% of its employees were covered by five-year contracts.
It is difficult to determine the weight given to this evidence by the Board
at that time, but it seems that today the only value would be in relation to the
total number of contracts or the total number of employees in the industry.
Perhaps this evidence was submitted because of a Board comment, see
Bendix Aviation Corp., note 41 supra that "we do not require that all con-
tracts of any individual employer . . . be for the same duration." This
would indicate, if it has more than the one in question, at least some must
be of the same term. The Allis-Chalmers case, supra, however, was decided
on the same day as the Bendix case, supra, and the General Motors case,
note 30 supra, and it is more likely that all possible persuasive material was
presented to the Board in an effort to show "stability in the industry."
s5 116 N.L.R.B. No. 278, 39 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1956).
86 See note 30 supra.
s7 See note 85 supra. For sharp disagreement see the dissenting opinion. It is
very clear and to the point on the retroactive issue and the immateriality of
other employer's contracts in relation to the one in question.
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time of petition, whether any given contract of longer than two years'
duration will stand as a bar to a representative election. The test of
"reasonableness" is applied on the date the Board hands down its
decision. This case, however, does clear up one open question. The
distinction between the former "customary in the industry" test and
the present "substantial part of the industry" test is brought into
sharp focus. "Recent innovations,""" the present trends," and new
policiesP° are a major factor in determining reasonableness today,9 '
whereas under the old rule, no consideration was given to these cir-
cumstances. In addition to this case, a comparison of the two tests also
reveals that, besides requiring a well established contract duration
practice in the industry, the "custom" test required the party asserting
the contract as a bar, to show a greater number of agreements of a
similar duration. While 30% of the contracts in the industry has been
sufficient to satisfy the "substantial" test,"2 the "custom" test was
never satisfied with less than 50%, and usually the figure ran much
higher.
III. CONCLUSION
It is well established that whenever a contract is urged as a bar
to a representative election, the National Labor Relations Board is
faced with balai;cing two separate interests: the statutory objective of
maintaining industrial stability by stabilizing industrial relations for
the duration of a valid collective bargaining contract and the statutory
right of employees to select and change their bargaining representa-
tives.9 3  In balancing this conflict the Board has developed the rule
that an existing, valid contract will bar a representative election for a
reasonable period of time, or conversely, employees can change their
bargaining representatives at reasonable intervals.94  This policy has
evolved over the years so that today contracts of two years' duration
are per se reasonable.9 5 Similarly, contracts of over two years' dura-
tion are reasonable, per se, for the initial two year period96 and for
the entire period if a substantial part of the industry is currently9 7
ss American Pharmaceutical Co., Inc., see note 25 supra.
s9 Puritan Ice Co., see note 27 supra.
9 Reed Roller Bit Co., see note 26 supra..
91 It is also significant that these rules have not been used since the General
Motors test, see note 30 supra, was announced except in Supreme Sunrise
Food Exchange, Inc., see note 45 supra, which case seems to be a bad ruling
unless it was handed down on the basis, along with the other cases in note 45
supra, of the rules in operation prior to the General Motors case. If this is so,
the Board does not so indicate in its decision.
92 The Home Curtain Corp., see note 81 supra.
93 See notes 4 and 5 supra. Also see Thompson Wire Co., note 45 supra, General
'Motors 'Corp., Detroit Transmission Division, note 30 supra, and Reed Roller
Bit Co., note 26 supra.
94 Ibid.
95 See note 29 supra.
9r Ibid.
97 See note 85 supra.
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covered by contracts of a similar term.98 Agreements up to five years
in duration have been found to be reasonable.99 No little difficulty is
presented in determining the industry'00 involved, and what is a sub-
stantial part thereof.101 This results in uncertainty and unnecessary
litigation, as well as in the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. 10 2 This situation aids no one, and certainly frustrates the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act.
0 3
There are a number of possible solutions which would allow em-
ployers and unions to operate with certainty and predictability in this
area.'0 4  The first, and most obvious, is for the Board to establish
defiinite standards for its present test of reasonableness. This would
necessitate the overruling of the recent Thompson Wire Company
case"05 which make it abosolutely impossible for an employer or union
to determine, at the time a petition is filed, whether the contract in-
volved is of reasonable duration or not. Many things can happen;
much time, effort and money can be spent and wasted between the
petitioning date and a Board decision. Fixed rules for determining
"industry" and "substantial" are essential. This could be accomplished
by establishing unequivocal guides. The Standard Industrial Classi-
fication Manual, already used as a reference by the Board, is adequate
for enumerating the various possible industries. The problem of set-
ting up an unequivocal guide for what industry involved is no easy
task, and the Board's problem is appreciated. One answer is to make
the determination strictly on a plant-for-plant basis, as is sometimes
now done. Another, is to set up a series of guides, similar to the
categories utilized in this comment through an analysis of the various
decisions. 10 6 It seems that the number of employees concerned with a
particular industry should be the criteria for establishing the primary
industry. This seems more logical than the "dollar value" approach,
because the Act deals with the employer-employee relationship. The
"dollar value" approach would allow a majority of the employees, con-
cerned with another industry, to have their contract classified in the
industry returning the most money for the employer.
The determination of substantial should be fairly simple. A defiinite
percentage is always an arbitrary figure, but the line must be drawn
somewhere. Since the Board has already found 30% of the employees
08 See note 30 supra and all subsequent cases.
99 See notes 77, 78 and 79 supra.
100 See notes 39 through 69 and 79, 80, and 81 supra.
101 See notes 85 through 95 supra.
102 See note 39 supra.
103 See note 4 supra.
104 These solutions are based on the Board's reasoning for changing and modi-
fying the various rules and tests in this area. See rationale of cases cited,
notes 92 and 26 supra.
205 See note 85 supra.
106 See notes 52 through 69 supra.
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in the entire industry to be substantial,1 7 this percentage should suffice.
This type of standard is not wholly satisfactory for an industry that
fluctuates frequently with the number employed, but then, no matter
what the industry, the figure will not be a constant. The average num-
ber employed for a set period prior to the petition seems to be a
fair approach.
A second possibility is to establish a straight election bar rule for
a definite number of years, like the present per se two year rule,1s
but without the additional test of reasonableness. Whether two, or
another number of years would be most satisfactory, is certainly a
debatable point.109 It seems, however, that since contracts up to five
years in duration have already been found reasonable "without un-
reasonably restricting employees in their right to change representa-
tives," 0 five, as easily as two years, could be, per se, a bar to an
election. A greater number of years is also feasible. After all, the
Board concedes that collective bargaining has passed the "trial and
error" period."' Therefore, it must be assumed that employers and
unions carefully consider their contract from all angles. With this
approach, it can hardly be argued that the Board is in a better position
than the contracting parties to determine reasonableness. The em-
ployees, however, must be saved the right to change representatives,
if desired. Therefore, some limit on reasonableness is necessary. The
major industries, previously adopting the five year contract, are now
working under a three year plan. Perhaps this is the best figure, as
it is not so short a span as to thwart industrial planning, and yet, not
so long as to prevent periodic contract changes, when, and if, needed.
A third possibility would be for the Board to return to its original
agency theory and allow elections at any time, but requiring the chal-
lenging union, if successful, to be bound by the terms of the existing
labor contract until its expiration."1 2 This possibility is highly un-
likely as the Board feels that it "hamstrings" a newly elected union."'
However, with the carefully worked out contracts of today, the chief
cause of changing representatives is poor contract administration,
rather than any particular contract provisions. A return to this rule,
it seems, would of necessity improve union contract administration.
An acceptable compromise solution, utilizing parts of the second
and third suggestions would seem realistic. It is based on the as-
sumption that of the various contract terms, three years is reasonable
107 See note 81 supra.
108 This suggestion was first made in the dissent, see note 39 supra.
109 See concurring opinion, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., note 40 supra.
110 See note 99 supra.
"' See note 84 supra.
112 See notes 7, 8, 9 and 10 supra.
"3 American Seating Co., see note 8 supra.
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per se."1 4 All labor contracts, regardless of term, and regardless of
the industry involved, would be considered a bar to representative
elections for a period of three years, unless of course, the contract was
for a lesser period, which period would then govern. Agreements of
more than three years' duration would not bar a challenging union
from obtaining an election after the three year period. If successful,
however, the new union would be bound by the existing, valid agree-
ment for a period of one year, or until its termination by its own
terms, whichever event occurred first. Clearly, this would afford both
employers and unions definite industrial stability for at least-a three
year period without unduly restricting employees from changing- their
representative if they so desire. The "grace" period of one year would
allow the employer to plan for a new negotiation rather than require
him to proceed without sufficient preparation. This is especially nec-
essary in view of long range financing of fringe and special benefit
programs. It would also allow the new union preparation time under
immediate administrative conditions and time for the new local repre-
sentatives to better acquaint themselves with union policies and prob-
lems. Many differences undoubtedly would be better understood prior
to actual contract negotiation, thus increasing the possibility of a
more efficient contract and a sounder industrial relationship.
In all events, it seems that the problem is of sufficient importance,
and the time appropriate, for further study and consideration by the
Board. Clarification and workable rules are desirable. It has been
suggested that the Board entertain proposals from both labor and
management before instituting a permanent rule. 15  The adoption of
this suggestion would undoubtedly improve the situation.
WILLIAM P. LEfMER
114 The three year term fits the reasoning given for adopting the two year
term. See note 26 supra.
115 See concurring opinion, Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., note 40 supra.
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